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RESOLUTION III OF THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE
TIMOR GAP TREATY
James K. Kenny
Abstract: Australia and Indonesia signed the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 as a
means to jointly benefit from the petroleum reserves in the Timor Sea between East
Timor and northwestern Australia without permanently resolving their dispute over
seabed delimitation. The Treaty utilizes rights granted by the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I1, 1982). Resolution In of the UNCLOS
III provides the benefit of the Convention's rights to United Nations-recognized
non-self-governing peoples, which includes the East Timorese people. Under
Resolution III, the East Timorese are entitled to all of the Convention's rights, including
sovereignty over natural resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The Timor
Gap Treaty violates international law by using the UNCLOS III's rights to exploit
petroleum reserves within the East Timorese people's EEZ, a seabed area reserved to the
East Timorese under Resolution Ill. Australia and Indonesia cannot assume the benefits
of the UNCLOS III without also respecting its obligations. The International Court of
Justice may adjudicate the validity of the Timor Gap Treaty in a pending case, East
Timar (Portugal v. Australia).
INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 1989, Australia and Indonesia signed the Timor Gap
Treaty, I creating a Joint Development Zone (JDZ) for petroleum development
in the Timor Sea. The JDZ temporarily resolved a seventeen-year conflict
between the two states concerning seabed delimitation. 2  Following
Indonesia's 1975 invasion and forcible annexation of the former Portuguese
colony of East Timor,3 the major issue of contention between Australia and
Indonesia concerned jurisdiction over the seabed between Australia and East
I Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in the Area
Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Dec. 11, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 469
(entered into force Feb. 9, 1991)[hereinafter Timor Gap Treaty].
2 The distance between the northwest coast of Australia and Indonesian East Timor in the Timor Sea
is approximately 400 nautical miles. Ernst Willheim, Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary
Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint Development Zone in the 'Timor Gap", 29 NAT. REsOURCEs J. 821,
822 (1989).
3 Roger S. Clark, The "Decolonization" of East Timor and the United Nations Norms on
Self-Determination andAggression, 7 Yale J. World Pub. Ord. 2, 9 (1980); see also Anthony Bergin, The
Australian-Indonesian Timor Gap Maritime Boundary Agreement, 5 INT'L J. ESTtJARINE & COAsTAL L.
383, 384 (1990).
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Timor.4 Australia claimed it to the maximum extent of its broad continental
shelf, while Indonesia claimed jurisdiction over the seabed extending to the
median line in the Timor Sea under the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (the Convention).5
Both Australia and Indonesia utilized rights provided under the
Convention to establish their respective claims to the disputed seabed -and
their joint right to reach a temporary compromise in creating the JDZ.6 By
using the Convention, however, Indonesia and Australia also receive
correlative duties under the Convention as well as rights. One of the duties is
the responsibility of states to implement the Convention for the benefit of
non-self-governing peoples recognized by the United Nations (U.N.). 7
Resolution Ell of the Convention contains this duty; the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea passed Resolution III as an integral part of
the Convention. 8 Resolution III declares that the rights of the Convention
"shall be implemented for the benefit of the people of the
[non-self-governing] territory with a view to promoting their well-being and
development." 9 The U.N. General Assembly recognized the East Timorese
as a non-self-governing people and called for an act of self-determination in
East Timor.10
The East Timorese people's Resolution m rights will likely be asserted
against the Timor Gap Treaty by Portugal in its pending case against
4 The disputed seabed area is called the Timor Gap. Willheim, supra note 2, at 822.
5 Id. at 826-28; Asnani Usman, The Timor Gap in the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
Boundary between Indonesia andAustralia, 14 INDON. Q. 375, 381-83 (1986) [hereinafter Delimitation];
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M.
1261 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention took nine years to write and covers all major aspects of
the law of the sea, including: conservation, fishing, navigation, overflight, pollution, resource exploration
and exploitation, scientific research, and shipping. The Convention is not yet in force.
6 Australia and Indonesia rely on contrasting interpretations of Article 76 of the Convention
concerning definition of the continental shelf, and upon Article 83 concerning dispute resolution between
states with opposite coasts. See Willheim, supra note 2, at 827-28, 831; Delimitation, supra note 5, at
381-83. Indonesia has ratified and Australia has signed the Convention. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs
and the Law of the Sea, Status of the U.N.C.L.O.S., 20 LAW OF THE SEABULL. 1, 1, 3 (1992) [hereinafter
Status]. Signing a treaty means that a state is considering ratification, see Ian Brownlie, PRtNciPLEs OF
PuBLic INTERNATIONAL LAW 603 (3rd ed. 1979), but it does not oblige the state to ratify the treaty, Paul
V. McDade, The Interim Obligation Between Signature and Ratification of a Treaty, 32 NET. INT'L L.
Rav. 5, 10 n.20 (1985). Ratification is the method by which a nation gives its consent to be bound by a
treaty, Id. at 9.7 Final Act of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, Resolution MII(1)(a),
U.N. Doec. A/CONF.62/121, 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1257 [hereinafter Final Act].
8 Id. at 1252.
9 Id. at 1257.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 25-27, 32, 37-44.
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Australia before the International Court of Justice." Portugal asserts that the
Treaty violates the East Timorese people's rights to self-determination and
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 12 This case may provide the
opportunity for a definitive pronouncement on Resolution m's effect upon the
Treaty.
An evaluation of the legality of the Timor Gap Treaty under the
Convention, however, need not await the outcome of Portugal's case.
Existing international law provides sufficient guidance for an analysis of the
rights and duties of those parties claiming the seabed in the Timor Gap. This
Comment reviews the history of East Timor and the United Nations' reactions
to Indonesia's 1975 invasion. Directly following is the conference history of
Resolution HI, which is necessary to interpret the Resolution's ambiguous
language and properly define Australia's and Indonesia's obligations under it.
The final sections analyze Resolution III's relationship to the Treaty and
suggest means by which Resolution H could be enforced. This Comment
concludes that the Timor Gap Treaty abrogates international law by
exploiting the natural resources of the non-self-governing peoples of East
Timor in violation of Resolution H.
I. POLITICAL HISTORY OF EAST TIMOR
A. East Timor and the Indonesian Invasion
East Timor encompasses approximately 7,000 square miles on the
eastern half of the island of Timor,13 with a population exceeding 700,000.14
Portugal controlled East Timor as a colony from the early 1500's' 5 until
1975.16 As Portugal sought to decolonize its worldwide colonial territories in
1974-75, nationalist movements within Portuguese East Timor fought a civil
war during the autumn of 1975 for control of the colony. 17 When Portugal
withdrew its colonial administration from East Timor during the fighting,' 8
11 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1991 I.C.L 9 (Order of May 3).
12 Communiqu6, International Court of Justice, No. 91/6, 2 (Feb. 22, 1991).
13 Timor at a Glance, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 23, 1975, at A4.
14 Steven Erlanger, East Timor, Reopened by Indonesians, Remains a Sad and Terrifying Place,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, at A18.
15 Timor at a Glance, supra note 13.
16 Talks Fail to End Timor Civil War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1975, at A4; John G. Taylor,
INDONFsIA's FORGOTrEN WAR: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OFEASTTIMOR 51 (1991).
17 Clark, supra note 3, at 5, 7.
18 Indonesia Bids Portugal Let Her Hold Timor Talks, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1975, at A3.
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Indonesia affirmed its adherence to the principle of decolonization and
self-determination for Portuguese East Timor.19
Following the announcement of the creation of a new state by socialist
forces within East Timor on November 28, 1975, and the counter-declaration
by minority political parties proclaiming the integration of East Timor with
Indonesia on November 30,20 however, Indonesia invaded the island on
December 7, 1975.21 In response to the attack, Portugal severed diplomatic
relations with Indonesia and condemned Indonesia's armed aggression. 22
Portugal asserted it was the administrative power in East Timor and was
responsible for decolonizing the territory.2 3 Portugal also insisted that the
East Timorese people had a right to self-determination, and that negotiations
should be held to reach a peaceful solution.24
The U.N. General Assembly responded to Indonesia's actions by
passing a resolution on December 12, 1975, which deplored "the military
intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor" and
demanded that Indonesia "withdraw without delay ... in order to enable the
people of the Territory [sic] freely to exercise their right to self-determination
and independence." 25  On December 22, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 384, which affirmed East Timor's right to
self-determination and called on Indonesia to withdraw from the territory.26
After a review of the situation on April 22, 1976, the Security Council passed
Resolution 389, which reaffirmed the right of the East Timorese to
self-determination and called upon Indonesia to withdraw its forces. 27
Indonesia ignored the U.N.'s requests and continued to incorporate East
Timor into Indonesia.28
19 1d.
20 Clark, supra note 3, at 7-8; Thomas M. Franck & Paul Hoffman, The Right of
Self-Determination in Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. INrr'LL. & POL. 331,346 (1976).
21 David A. Andelman, Indonesians Hold Portuguese Timor After Incursion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1975, at Al.
22 Portugal Severs Ties to Indonesia, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1975, at A9; Marvine Howe, Portugal
Assails Indonesian Move, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1975, at A13.
23 Portugal Severs Ties to Indonesia, supra note 22.
24 Id.
25 The vote was 72 to 10, with 43 abstentions. The resolution recognized Portugal as the
administering power in East Timor. G.A. Res. 3485(XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at
118, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976).
26 S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF131 (1976).
27 S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st Seas., at 18, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1977).
28 Clark, supra note 3, at 10.
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Indonesia set up an undemocratically elected government in East
Timor.29 That government requested integration with Indonesia,30 a request
granted by Indonesia's formal annexation of East Timor on July 17, 1976.31
Following the annexation, the U.N. General Assembly rejected Indonesia's
integration of East Timor, called for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces, and
again reaffinned the East Timorese people's right to self-determination and
independence. 32
The Indonesian invasion and occupation was brutal.33  From
1975-1980, between 100,000 to 200,000 East Timorese died due to
execution, disease, starvation and combat,34 from a population of 650,000.35
Indonesia retains control of East Timor today and maintains an aggressive
military presence in the territory. 36
B. The General Assembly's Actions After the 1976 Annexation
In 1977 the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 67 to 26, with 47
abstentions, again rejected the annexation of East Timor and reiterated the
right of the East Timorese to self-determination. 37 In 1978,38 1979,39 and
1980,40 the General Assembly passed resolutions similar to the 1977
resolution. 41  Support for the East Timorese in the General Assembly
gradually deteriorated, and in 1981 the General Assembly passed a resolution
that merely called upon the involved parties in East Timor to cooperate with
29 Id. at 14-18; Hamish McDonald, East Timor Body Asks to be Part of Indonesia, WASH. POST,
June 1, 1976, at A17.
30 Paul D. Elliott, The East Timor Dispute, 27 INT'L& COMp. L.Q. 238, 239-240 (1978).
31 East Timor Becomes Indonesian Province, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1976, at A7.
32 G.A. Res. 31/53, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 125, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977).
33 Taylor, supra note 16, at 79-88, 100-110; Erlanger, supra note 14. See generally Jill Jolliffe,
EAST TIMOR: NATIONALISM AND COLONIALISM (1978).
34 Erlanger, supra note 14; East Timor: Time for Accounting, CHRISTIAN SCn. MONITOR, Apr. 24,
1992, at 20.
35 Timor at a Glance, supra note 13. A larger percentage of the population died in East Timor than
in Pol Pot's Cambodia. Erlanger, supra note 14; East Timor: TimeforAccounting, supra note 34.
36 Indonesian soldiers massacred more than 100 demonstrators on Nov. 12, 1991. Toll in Indonesia
is Put at 100, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1991, at A6; Peter Wise, Up to 60 Killed in East Timor, WASH. POST,
Nov. 13, 1991, at A21. Widespread arrests have recently occurred in East Timor. 100 Timorese Arrested
Before Australian Visit, FOREION BROADCAST INFO. SERVICE, East Asia, No. 92-207, Oct. 26, 1992, at 40
(NewsBank).
37 G.A. Res. 32/34, U.N. GAOR, 32nd Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 169, U.N. Do. A/32/45 (1978).
38 G.A. Res. 33/39, U.N. GAOP, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 181, U.N. Doe. A/33/45 (1979).
39 G.A. Res. 34/40, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 206, U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (1980).
40 G.A. Res. 35/27, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 219, U.N. Doe. A/35/48 (1981).
41 Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in INTERNATIONALLAW 411 (1988).
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the United Nations to reach self-determination. 42 The 1981 resolution
passed by a vote of 54 to 42, with 46 abstentions. 43 A resolution with similar
wording passed in 1982 by a vote of 50 to 46, with 50 abstentions. 44
After 1982, not enough support was available in the General Assembly
to adopt any resolutions concerning the East Timorese right to
self-determination.45 Further, the Security Council has not addressed the
question of self-determination for East Timor since its April 1976 resolution.
C. Australia's Recognition of Indonesian East Timor
Australia supported Indonesia by voting against resolutions on East
Timor in the General Assembly after 1978 because Australia felt that for all
practical purposes, East Timor was part of Indonesia. 46 In January 1978,
Australia granted de facto recognition to Indonesia's control of East Timor.47
Australia sought to resolve the Timor Gap dispute in order to exploit its
continental shelf for petroleum resources by entering into seabed delimitation
negotiations with Indonesia in February 1979.48
Australia initially had reservations about supporting Indonesia so soon
after the invasion of East Timor.49  Any reservations were apparently
overridden, however, by Australia's choice to pursue its economic interest in
gaining access to the Timor Gap. 50 Entry into the negotiations, which sought
to establish seabed boundaries between Australia and Indonesian-occupied
East Timor, signified dejure recognition by Australia of the incorporation of
East Timor into Indonesia. 51
Australia and Indonesia held negotiations concerning the Timor Gap on
an irregular basis between 1979 and 1989.52 Indonesia first proposed the
42 G.A. Res. 36/50, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 200, U.N. Doe. A/36/51 (1982).
43 East Timor Question, 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1182, 1185, U.N. Sales No. E.84.1.1.
44 G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 227, U.N. Do. A/37/51 (1983).
45 Hannikainen, supra note 41, at 412.
46 Self-determination: East Timor, 10 AUSTL Y.B. INT'LL. 272, 273 (1987).
47 See Recognition. Incorporation of Territory. Baltic States. East Timor, 8 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L.
278, 279 (1983).
48 Keith Suter, Australia's New Policy on Recognizing Governments, AusTL. Q., at 59-60 (Autumn
1989); Clark, supra note 3, at 8 n.29; Taylor, supra note 16, at 170.
49 Taylor, supra note 16, at 168.5 0 1d. at 170.
51 Suter, supra note 48, at 60.
52 Negotiations were held in February 1979, May 1979, November 1980, October 1981, February
1984, November 1984, October 1985, and September 1988 to December 1989. Asnani Usman, The Timor
Gap Treaty, 19 INDON. Q. 102, 103 (1991).
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idea of a joint development zone as a temporary solution in May 1979.53
Australia agreed to the idea during the October 1985 meeting.54 Negotiations
halted between 1986 and 1988 due to a decline in relations between Australia
and Indonesia, but by September 1988, relations had improved, 55 and the two
states finally reached an agreement on October 25, 1988.56 They signed the
Timor Gap Treaty on December 11, 198957 and the exploration contracts in
December 1991.58
Although Australia encountered some internal opposition in
recognizing Indonesia's control of East Timor, and in concluding the Timor
Gap treaty, resistance was minimal. 59 Australia was one of many nations that
withdrew support for East Timorese self-determination. International
support for self-determination in East Timor waned not only in the General
Assembly, 60 but also in the media, where East Timor's remoteness meant that
little attention was directed to the suffering of the East Timorese. 61 Indonesia
prevented media coverage of the struggle in East Timor by sealing off the
island to foreigners from 1975-1989.62
D. Indonesia's Position on East Timor
Indonesia contended in 1976 at the U.N. that it did not violate the right
of the East Timorese to self-determination. 63 Indonesia claimed that the East
Timorese exercised their right of self-determination in choosing to integrate
with Indonesia. 64 Indonesia also argued that cultural, ethnic, geographical
and historical ties between Indonesia and East Timor rendered East Timor an
53 Id.
541d.
5 5 ld. at 105.5 6 1d. at 103.
5 7 Id.
5 8 Timor Gap Oil ContractAwarded to Consortium, FoREIGN BROADCAST INFO. SERVICE, East Asia,
No. 91-240, Dec. 13, 1991, at 46 (NewsBank); Oil drilling in theTimor Gap began in December 1992.
Wilson da Silva, Clouds on Horizon as Timor Gap Drilling Begins, REUTrER LIBRARY REPORT, Dec. 30,
1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnews File.
59 See Recognition. Incorporation of Territory. Baltic States. East Timor, supra note 47, at 279-81;
Indonesia: Race for Sea-bed Oil in Timor Gap, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Alnews File.
60 See supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
61 Henry Kamm, The Silent Suffering of East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at
34,56.6 2 Erlanger, supra note 14.
63 U.N. Office of Public Information, Indonesia Told to Withdraw Without Delay; Council Issues
Call for Further Consultations, U.N. CHRON., May 1976, at 8, 13.6 4 Id.
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integral part of Indonesia. 65 Finally, Indonesia asserted that East Timor's
economic inviability prevented it from becoming an independent country.66
Indonesia asserted that the East Timorese chose to integrate with
Indonesia, a valid action under U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1541,67
which provides that non-self-governing territories can choose to integrate
with an independent state.68 Resolution 1541 requires that the "integration
should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the Territory's peoples
acting with a full knowledge of the change in their status."69  Indonesia
argued that these conditions were met by two pertinent acts of the East
Timorese people freely choosing integration: 1) the November 30, 1975
declaration of integration by East Timorese political parties inviting Indonesia
into East Timor;70 and 2) the May 31, 1976 resolution of the People's
Assembly of Timor requesting integration with Indonesia. 71
Indonesia maintained that it complied with all of the U.N. resolutions
concerning self-determination of non-self-governing territories, which
properly made East Timor a part of Indonesia. Thus, any perceived problems
were matters internal to Indonesia and shielded from any international
interference by U.N. Charter Article 2(7),72 which renders "internal" matters
immune from international action. Therefore, Indonesia had a right to claim
the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off of East Timor, and it
had a concomitant right to enter into a JDZ treaty with Australia concerning
those resources.
65 Clark, supra note 3, at 12; Elliott, supra note 30, at 247.
66 Clark, supra note 3, at 12; Elliott, supra note 30, at 247-48.
67 U.N. Office of Public Information, Varying Views Expressed in Debate on Developments in East
Timor U.N. CHRON, Oct. 1976, at 20, 21 [hereinafter Varying iews].
6 G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., I Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).6 9 1d. at 30.
70 The East Timor Debate in the U.N. Decolonization Committee, INDONESIA MIRROR, Nov. 1986, at
1, 3 (Statement of S. Wiryono, Indonesian Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, before
the U.N. Decolonization Committee, Aug. 15, 1986); Varying Views, supra note 67, at 21.
71 Clark, supra note 3, at 13.
72 The relevant text of U.N. Charter Article 2(7) reads:
"[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State."
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I. RESOLUTION BIl
Resolution H173 of the Convention provides the benefit of the
Convention's rights to U.N.-recognized non-self-governing peoples in
subparagraph (1)(a). 74 The U.N., in its resolutions from 1975-1982 on the
problems in East Timor, recognized East Timor as a non-self-governing
territory whose people had a right to self-deternination.7 5 Therefore, the
provisions of Resolution III (1)(a) are applicable to the situation in East
Timor and require that any rights created by the Convention be implemented
for the benefit of the East Timorese people.
A. The Operative Paragraph of Resolution III
Subparagraph (1)(b) of Resolution III states that where there is a
dispute between states concerning the sovereignty of a territory, consultations
between the disputants are required.76 During the consultations, the interests
of the non-self-governing people of the territory shall be a fimdamental
consideration.7 7 Those interests, however, do not have to be the basis for a
decision or even the primary reason for a decision.
The practical reality of a state bringing a claim under Resolution III is
that the claimant state would be asserting the non-self-governing people's
73 Final Act of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, Resolution III,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/121, 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1257 [hereinafter Resolution I]. Resolution III states in
relevant part that:
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea... Bearing in mind the Charter of
the United Nations, in particular Article 73,
1. Declares that:
(a) In the case of a territory whose people have not attained full independence or other
self-governing status recognized by the United Nations, or a territory under colonial domination,
provisions concerning rights and interests under the Convention shall be implemented for the benefit of
the people of the territory with a view to promoting their well-being and development.
(b) Where a dispute exists between States over the sovereignty of a territory to which this
resolution applies, in respect of which the United Nations has recommended specific means of settlement,
there shall be consultations between the parties to that dispute regarding the exercise of the rights referred
to in subparagraph (a). In such consultations the interests of the people of the territory concerned shall be
a fundamental consideration. Any exercise of those rights shall take into account the relevant resolutions
of the United Nations and shall be without prejudice to the position of any party to the dispute. The States
concerned shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and shall
not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final settlement of the dispute.7 Id.
75 See supra notes 25-27, 32, 37-41 and accompanying text.
76 Resolution III, supra note 73.
7 7 Id.
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Convention rights against a state that had refused to grant them
self-governing status or to allow them a plebiscite to decide their fate. The
rights asserted would be the rights guaranteed to all states under the
Convention.78 Where a claimant state establishes a position supporting and
endorsing the rights of a non-self-governing people, that position cannot be
prejudiced by any other party to the dispute under subparagraph (1)(b). 79
Therefore, assuming all parties to the dispute must follow the Resolution
because it is legally binding upon them, where a state asserts a
non-self-governing people's rights as its position in the dispute, those
people's rights cannot be prejudiced by the other parties to the dispute,
whether in the provisional measures or the final settlement.
B. The Purpose of Resolution III
The text of Resolution II lacks clarity in parts. The purpose of the
Resolution is clear,80 but the ambiguity of its operative paragraph sl reflects
the compromise to which the Conference finally arrived. The travaux
preparatoires (preparatory works) of Resolution IIJ elucidate the framework
in which the text is to be interpreted.
Article 3 1(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires
that treaties be interpreted according to the plain meaning of their terms and
in accordance with their purposes.82 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention
further provides that the preparatory work of a treaty's conference may be
used to interpret the treaty.83 Since Resolution 1H (1)(b) is ambiguous as to
whether the non-self-governing people's rights under the Convention can be
78 Resolution nI(l)(a) gives the people of a non-self-governing territory the "rights and interests
under the Convention."7 9 Resolution III(l)(b), supra note 73.8 0 See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
81 Cf 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY 482
(Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Commentary] (indicating limitations in the operative
paragraph and the difficulty of forecasting Resolution II's applications).
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Article 3 1(1) reads: "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose."
83 Id. Article 32 reads:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 3 1:
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
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usurped notwithstanding a state's dispute as to sovereignty, it is useful to
explore the negotiations surrounding the passage of the Resolution in order to
interpret subparagraph (1)(b).
Resolution I is not a law of the sea subject, as it deals with territories
under foreign occupation. 84 It became an issue of political contention,
85
however, at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
11).86
The original topic of Resolution III, territories under foreign
occupation, began in 1973 in Sub-Committee II of the Sea-bed Committee.
87
The topic originated in two draft articles on the exclusive economic zone, one
submitted by Kenya,88 and the other by a multi-nation group. 89 Until 1974,90
the topic was discussed on the Second Committee's agenda as part of item
19(a): islands under colonial dependence or foreign domination or control.91
The territories under foreign occupation did not generate much interest during
the Sea-bed Committee discussions,92 but it became an item of contention
during its review at the 38th to 40th meetings of the Second Committee in
August 1974.93
84 Commentary, supra note 81, at 480.
8 5 1d.
86 The UNCLOS III lasted from December 1973 until December 1982. Final Act, 7, supra note 7,
at 1246-47.
87 Commentary, supra note 81, at 480.
88 "No territory under foreign domination and control shall be entitled to establish an Economic
zone," Draft Articles on Exclusive Economic Zone Concept, Submitted by Kenya, art. XI, Sea-bed
Committee, Sub-Committee H Summary Records A/AC.138/SC.IIIL.10, reproduced in Report of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 21, at 180, 182, U.N. Doec. A/8721 (1972).
89 "No State exercising foreign domination and control over a territory shall be entitled to establish
an economic zone or to enjoy any other right or privilege referred to in these articles with respect to such
territory." Algeria et al., Draft Articles on Exclusive Economic Zone, art. XI, Sea-bed Committee,
Sub-Committee II Summary Records A/AC.138/SC.II/L.40, reproduced in III Report of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 28
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 21, at 87, 89, U.N. Doec. A/9021 (1973).
90 Commentary, supra note 81, at 480.
91 Id. The I UNCLOS consisted of three main committees, and throughout the Conference the
Second Committee handled the subject of the rights of non-self-governing people eventually drafted into
Resolution Ill.92 Id.
93 See 38th, 39th, and 40th meetings of the III UNCLOS Second Committee, August 13-14, 1974,
in 2 Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Rec. 278-89, U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.4
(1975)[hereinafter Official Rec.].
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At the Second Committee discussions, eight proposals were advanced
relating to item 19(a).94 The proposals generally asserted that the rights of
94 Commentary, supra note 81, at 480. The proposals included:
1. That nothing in the propositions set herein [referring to the exclusive economic zone] should
be construed as recognizing rights of territories under colonial, foreign or racist domination to the
foregoing.
Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the Issues of the Lat of the Sea, 10, In
UNCLOS Doc. A/CONF.62/33 (1974), in 3 Official Rec. 63, 64, U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.5 (1975).
2. A strong trend has developed in this Conference to prevent colonial or foreign dominating
Powers from reaping the benefits of the economic zones of dependent territories under their
control....[T]he rights and benefits of such zones shall belong to, and be exercisable only by, the
inhabitants of such territories.
Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Committee of the Congress of Micronesia, III UNCLOS
Doc. A/CONF.62/L.6 (1974), in 3 Official Rec. 83, 84.
3. In respect of a territory whose people have attained neither full independence nor some other
self-governing status following an act of Self-Determination under the auspices of the United Nations,
the rights to the resources of the economic zone created in respect of that territory and to the resources of
its continental shelf are vested in the inhabitants of that territory to be exercised by them for their benefit
and in accordance with their needs and requirements. Such rights may not be assumed, exercised or
profited from or in any way infringed by a metropolitan or foreign power administering or occupying that
territory.
Fii et al., Draft Articles on Islands and on Territories under Foreign Domination or Control, art.
B, III UNCLOS Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.30 (1974), in 3 Official Rec. 210, 211.
4. No economic zone must be established by any State which has dominion over or controls a
foreign territory in waters contiguous to that territory.
Bulgaria et al., Draft Articles on the Economic Zone, art. 10, mI UNCLOS Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.38 (1974), in 3 Official Rec. 214, 215.
5. No economic zone shall be established by any State which has dominion over or controls a
foreign island in waters contiguous to that island.
The inhabitants of such islands shall be entitled to create their economic zone at any time prior
to or after attaining independence or self-rule. The right to the resources of such economic zone and to
the resources of its continental shelf are vested in the inhabitants of that island to be exercised by them for
their benefit and in accordance with their needs or requirements
In case the inhabitants of such islands do not create an economic zone, the Authority shall be
entitled to explore and exploit such areas, bearing in mind the interests of the inhabitants.
Turkey: Draft Articles on the Regime of Islands, art. 3, 11 UNCLOS Doc. AICONF.62/C.21L.55
(1974), in 3 Official Rec. 230.
6. The rights recognized or established in this Convention shall not be invoked by the colonial or
occupying Power in respect of islands and other territories under colonial domination or foreign
occupation as long as that situation persists.
Argentina et al., Draft Article on Islands and Other Territories under Colonial Domination or
Foreign Occupation, III UNCLOS Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.58 (1974), in 3 Official Rec. 232.
7. Concerning islands under colonial domination, racist regime or foreign occupation, the rights
to the maritime spaces and to the resources thereof belong to the inhabitants of those islands and must
profit only their own development.
No colonial or foreign or racist Power which administers or occupies those islands shall
exercise those rights, profit from them or in any way infringe upon them.
Algeria et al., Draft Articles on the Regime of Islands, art. 5, HI UNCLOS Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.62/Rev. 1 (1974), in 3 Official Rec. 232, 233.
8. In respect of a territory whose people have not achieved full independence or some other
self-governing status recognized by the United Nations, the rights to the resources of its exclusive
economic zone belong to the people of that territory. These rights shall be exercised by such people for
VOL. 2 No. I
RESOLUTION III AND THE TIMOR GAP TREATY
the Convention belonged to the people of non-self-governing territories. 95
Those rights could not be assumed, exercised, profited from or in any way
infiinged upon by an occupying or foreign nation.96 The proposals applied to
both islands and non-self-governing territories. 97
The proposals and the ensuing debate indicated support for the
principle that people of non-self-governing territories should benefit from the
resources of such territories. 98 One representative stated that "[t]he new law
of the sea should be based on principles of justice and respect for
self-determination and sovereignty and could not serve directly or indirectly
to consolidate unjust or unlawful situations." 99 Another representative argued
that "[t]he obligations created by. . . [the article concerning territories under
colonial or foreign domination] should be as strict as any of the other
obligations imposed by the new convention and should be subject to the same
enforcement machinery." 100
Following these discussions the Second Committee reduced the
previously submitted eight proposals to four formulas.' 0 1 The four formulas
were incorporated into Provision 240 of the Main Trends Working Paper of
the Second Committee.102  The four formulas summarized the eight
proposals l03 previously submitted to the Second Committee. By the third
session of the Second Committee in 1975, the four formulas were reduced to
a single text.104 The single text expanded the coverage of the proposals
their benefits and in accordance with their needs and requirements. Such rights may not be assumed,
exercised or benefited from or in any way be infringed upon by a foreign Power administering or
occupying or purporting to administer or to occupy such territory.
Gambia et al., Draft Articles on the Exclusive Economic Zone, art. 11, 11 UNCLOS Doc.
AICONF.621C.2/L.81 (1974), in 3 Official Rec. 240,241.
95 See Id.
9 6 Fiji et al., DraftArticles on Islands and on Territories under Foreign Domination or Control, art.
B, supra note 94.
97 See supra note 94.9 8 See 38th, 39th, and 40th meetings of the Second Committee, supra note 93.
99 Id. at 286 (statement of Mr. Amato (Uruguay) at the 40th meeting of the Second Committee,
August 14, 1974).
100 Id. at 278 (statement of Mr. Templeton (New Zealand) at the 38th meeting of the Second
Committee, August 13, 1974).
101 Commentary, supra note 81, at 480.
102 Statement ofActivities of the Conference during Its First and Second Sessions, app. I, Working
Paper of the Second Committee: Main Trends, provision 240, IH UNCLOS Doc. A/CONF.62/L.8/Rev. 1
(1974), in 3 Official Rec. 93, 140.
103 See supra note 94.
104 Commentary, supra note 81, at 480; see C.2/Blue Paper No. 12 (Anonymous), reproduced in 4
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS 152 (Renate Platzdder ed.,
1983).
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beyond islands to cover all territories. 105 The single text was included in the
1975 Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), a document for the entire
Conference which would "take account of all the formal and informal
discussions" and "provide a basis for negotiation."'106 The single text became
article 136 of the ISNT, which read:
1. The rights recognized or established by the present
Convention to the resources of a territory whose people have not
attained either full independence or some other self-governing
status recognized by the United Nations, or a territory under
foreign occupation or colonial domination, or a United Nations
Trust Territory, or a territory administered by the United
Nations, shall be vested in the inhabitants of that territory, to be
exercised by them for their own benefit and in accordance with
their own needs and requirements.
2. Where a dispute over the sovereignty of a territory under
foreign occupation or colonial domination exists, the rights
referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be exercised until such
dispute is settled in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations.
3. In no case may the rights referred to in paragraph 1 be
exercised, profited or benefited from or in any way infringed by
a metropolitan or foreign power administering or occupying such
territory or purporting to administer or occupy such territory.
4. References in this article to a territory include continental
and insular territories. 10 7
At the fourth session of the Conference in 1976, the ISNT received an
article-by-article reading.108 Strong opposition to article 136 developed. 10 9
The Conference then prepared a Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) to
"reflect as far as possible the result of the informal negotiations that had taken
place" and to serve "as a basis for continued negotiation."" 0 Article 136 of
105 Commentary, supra note 81, at 480.
106 Informal Single Negotiating Text (1975), note by the president of the conference, m11 UNCLOS
Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8, in 4 Official Rec. 137, 137, U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.10 (1975).
107 Id., art. 136.
108 Commentary, supra note 81, at 481.
10 9
.1d.
110 Revised Single Negotiating Text (1976), note by the president of the conference, I UNCLOS
Doc. AJCONF.62/WP.8/Rev. 1, in 5 Official Rec. 125, 125, U.N. Sales No. E.76.V.8 (1976).
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the ISNT was taken from the numbered articles and placed at the end of the
RSNT with the new designation "Transitional Provision.""' The Chairman
of the Second Committee commented in his introductory note that:
The article dealing with territories under foreign occupation or
colonial domination resulted in a long debate in the Committee.
After reflecting on the debate I did not feel that I should make
either major additions to or deletions from the existing text,
except to redraft paragraph 2 in less absolute terms.112
The new text of the Transitional Provision had the same first paragraph
as article 136 of the ISNT, but paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 were changed to read:
2. Where a dispute over the sovereignty of a territory under
foreign occupation or colonial domination exists, in respect of
which the United Nations has recommended specific means of
solution, rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be exercised
except with the prior consent of the parties to the dispute until
such dispute is settled in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
3. A metropolitan or foreign power administering, occupying or
purporting to administer or occupy a territory may not in any
case exercise, profit, or benefit from or in any way infringe the
rights referred to in paragraph 1.
4. References in this article to a territory include continental
territories and islands. 113
The changed text of paragraph 2 allowed disputing parties to consent to using
Convention-granted rights in disputed territories before reaching a final
settlement of the dispute.
The text of the RSNT was then incorporated into the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT)1 4 of the sixth session of the Conference
in 1977.115 The Conference placed the Transitional Provision at the end of
111 Commentary, supra note 81, at 481.
112 Revised Single Negotiating Text, chairman of the second committee introductory note, 20,
supra note 110, at 153.1 13 Id., Transitional Provision, at 172-73.
114 Informal Composite Negotiating Text (1977), nI UNCLOS Doc. A/CONF.62AWP.10, in 8
Official Rec. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.V.4 (1978).
115 Commentary, supra note 81 at 481.
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the ICNT,"n6 which meant that the Provision applied to all of the Convention's
numbered articles." 7  The positioning of the Transitional Provision went
unexplained by the Conference, 118 and no formal debate occurred.119
The Transitional Provision was next discussed at the Informal Plenary
on August 16, 1979.120 The supporters of the provision argued that "the term
'transitional' is to be understood as referring to the temporary status of the
non-self-governing territories for whose benefit the provision is meant, while
the provision itself is not transitional but substantive and has to be included in
the body of the Convention." 121 Those who opposed the provision asserted
that it "introduced political questions which are more appropriately dealt with
under the Charter of the United Nations and should not be mixed with the
legal questions which are the main concern of the Law of the Sea
Convention."' 22  The opponents further claimed that the Transitional
Provision would conflict with Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations,
and that the provision had no legal basis to vest rights to mineral resources in
people. 123 Supporters of the Transitional Provision responded that it actually
reaffirmed Article 73, and that "the concept of rights to resources being tied
to geographical factors and not to human beings" was "abhorrent."'124 In the
end the Informal Plenary accepted the Transitional Provision.125
The next action concerning the Transitional Provision occurred in
August 1981 when the Group of 77, a negotiating group at the I UNCLOS
composed of developing countries, 126 tried to "reinstate the transitional
provision among the numbered articles of the Convention."' 27 Further action
did not take place -until March 1982,128 when, under the direction of
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
1191Id.
120 Id.
121 President's Note, Informal Plenary on Final Clauses, 3(a), III UNCLOS Doe. FC/11 (1979,
mimeo.), reproduced in 12 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOcuMENTs
383, 384 (Renate Platz6der ed., 1987).
122 .d, 3(b).123.1d.
12 4
.Id, 3(c).
125 Id, 3(d). However, an argument was advanced that the subject should not be made into a
divisive issue that would prevent broad acceptance of the Convention. Id. at 385.
126 Tommy T.B. Koh and Shanmugam Jayakumar, The Negotiating Process of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in I UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
1982: A COMMENTARY 29, 81 (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1985).
127 Commentary, supra note 81, at 482.
128 Report ofthe President on the Question of Participation in the Convention (1982), III UINCLOS
Doc. A/CONF.62/L.86, in 16 Official Rec. 197, U.N. Sales No. E.84.V.2 (1984).
VOL. 2 No. I
RESOLUTION llI AND THE TJMOR GAP TREATY
Conference President Koh, a compromise was reached in order to avoid a
threatened deadlock. 129 The notes of President Koh describe the agreement:
There did not seem to be any controversy regarding the principle
upon which the transitional provision is based, i.e. that the
peoples of the territories mentioned therein should be the
beneficiaries of the resources of such territories. However, the
language [of the Transitional 'Provision] used to express this
principle, as well as the question of its placement with regard to
the convention, continued to be problematic. It was suggested
that the transitional provision could become a resolution of the
Conference. This idea seemed to present the best
compromise. 130
The Transitional Provision was thus redrafted into Resolution In and placed
in Annex I of the Final Act of the Conference.
Placing the Transitional Provision as a resolution to the Final Act
indicates that the Conference viewed the substance of Resolution III as a
moral statement, and not an enforceable provision of the Convention.
However, Resolution III was passed by the Conference, along with the
Convention, as an integral whole. 131 Therefore, Resolution II is as legally
binding as the Convention itself.
The travaux preparatoires of Resolution III elucidate the basic
principle behind the resolution: non-self-governing peoples should benefit
from the resources of their territories. 132 This basic principle is consistent
with one of the objects of the Convention, the equitable utilization of ocean
resources by all peoples of the world.133  The predecessor drafts of
Resolution Ell contained strong language asserting the basic principle of the
Resolution, however, the drafting of the Transitional Provision toned down
the stridency of the language. Paragraph 3 of the Transitional Provision was
forcefully worded, but was diluted during the compromise, and ultimately
became Resolution III(1)(b). Resolution III's effect upon occupying states is
129 Commentary, supra note 81, at 482.
130 Report of the President on the Question of Participation in the Convention, 19, supra note
128, at 199.13 1 Final Act, supra note 7, at 1252; 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982:
A COMMENTARY 448 (Myron R Nordquist ed., 1985).
132 Report of the President on the Question of Participation in the Convention, 19, supra note
128, at 199.
133 Convention, pmbl, supra note 5, at 1271.
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still not clear, but the basic principle behind the Resolution serves as a
framework in which to interpret it, namely that U.N.-recognized
non-self-governing peoples are entitled to the Convention's rights, including
sovereignty over the natural resources in their exclusive economic zone.
C. The U.N. Charter's Effect on Resolution III
The Resolution, in limiting its *operation to states in subparagraph
(1)(a), appears to provide no avenue for a non-self-governing people to bring
claims on their own behalf to a negotiations forum. The non-self-governing
people could act through the United Nations Trusteeship Committee. But
placing a territory in the care of the Committee is a voluntary action of the
administering state, 134 and Portugal, the administering state in East Timor,
never did so.135
Non-self-governing territories do have another means of redress
through U.N. Charter Article 73 and U.N. Resolutions 1541 and 1514.136
Article 73 obliges U.N. members that "have or assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a* full
measure of self-government . . . to take due account of the political
aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development
of their free political institutions."' 37 Article 73(e) requires members to
provide to the U.N. statistical information on the economic, social, and
educational conditions in the members' non-self-governing territories. 138
Resolution 1541,139 the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, expanded upon Charter Article 73. It
enumerated a set of guidelines, similar to the trusteeship system, for the
administration of non-self-governing territories.140
The General Assembly, in Resolution 1514, adopted the day before
Resolution 1541, stated that all peoples have the right to self-determination,
that "repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples
shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right
to complete independence," and that "[i]mmediate steps shall be taken ... to
134 U.N. Charter art. 75, art. 77(I)(c).
135 See Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Portuguese Timor Gap Litigation before the International
Court ofJustice: A BriefAppraisal ofAustralia's Position, 45 AUSTL. J. INT'L AFF. 170, 170, 172 (1991).136 See Franck & Hoffman, supra note 20, at 332-33.
137 U.N. Charter art. 73, pmbl. & (I,).
13 8 .d., (e).
139 G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 68.
140 ld.
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transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without . .. any
distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy
complete independence and freedom.'t 141 Complete independence is not the
only route to self-determination, as the General Assembly provided in
Resolution 1541, which allows for integration by a non-self-governing
territory into another state as one form of self-determination. 142 The primary
requirement for integration is a plebiscite that allows the free expression of
the "[t]erritory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their
Status. 143
East Timor is a U.N.-recognized non-self-governing territory.144
Resolution 1541, interpreting Article 73's obligations, and Resolution 1514
advance rights to non-self-governing peoples, 145 such as the East Timorese.
Australia and Indonesia, as members of the U.N., are obligated to respect
Article 73.146 Article 73 is specifically mentioned in Resolution ITI as a
context in which to approach the meaning of the Resolution. 147 Thus,
Australia and Indonesia must respect Resolution m and the rights it gives to
non-self-governing peoples as a duty imposed by the U.N. Charter.
Although Resolution I, as illuminated by Article 73 and Resolutions 1541
and 1514, has no provisions for enforcing compliance, it does provide
guidance as to the rights of non-self-governing peoples and the obligations
of states with respect to those rights.
D. The Legal Status of Resolution III Within the Final Act
Resolution Ell is contained in the Final Act of the Convention. The text
of the Convention does not indicate what legal weight the Final Act is to
carry. Literature dealing with final acts is limited. 148 A final act typically
describes the workings and decisions of its conference149 and is normally
141 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 1 Supp. No. 16, at 66, 67, U.N. Doe. A/4684 (196 1).
142 G.A. Res. 1541, princ. IX(a) & (b), supra note 68, at 30.
14 3 Id., princ. Ix(b).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27, 32, 37-44.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 136-143.
146 Parties to the U.N. Charter are bound by its provisions. See Brownlie, supra note 6, at 12.
147 See Resolution III, supra note 73.
148 John K. Gamble & Maria Frankowska, The Significance of Signature to the 1982 Montego Bay
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INTtLL. 121, 138 (1984).
149 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra note
131, at 445.
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signed by all the participants in the conference. 150 Final acts are usually not a
part of the treaty.151 Although contained in the Final Act, the Conference
passed Resolution III as an integral part of the Convention,152 and thus
Resolution III enjoys the same status as the Convention and is binding on
states to the same extent as the Convention. 153
E. The Convention's Status and the Interim Obligation
The Convention does not come into force until twelve months after the
sixtieth ratification or accession.154 Currently, 54 states have ratified or
acceded to the Convention. 155 Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, 156 before the Convention comes into force there may be a binding
interim obligation upon states which have ratified the Convention or signed it
without having yet indicated a rejection of it.
The General Assembly has called upon all nations to "refrain from
taking any action directed at undermining the Convention or defeating its
objectives and purposes."1 57 Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, "[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when ... it has signed the treaty."'158
Some scholars advocate that the Vienna Convention rises to the level of
customary international law, and thus binds all states. 159 Others hold that the
interim obligation of signatory states between signature and ratification or
rejection described in Article 18 is not an enforceable obligation, but rather a
150 Id.
151 Id. A final act is "neither a treaty nor a legally binding document, and there is no established
mechanism for enforcement of its provisions." John Donnelly & Elizabeth Miller, Ratification of the
Human Rights Treaties: Toward Giving Legal Effect to the Helsinki Final Act, 5 GEO. MAsON U. L. REv.
185, 185 (1982).
152 Final Act, 42, supra note 7, at 1252.
153 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
154 Convention, art. 308, supra note 5, at 1327.
155 U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Status of the UN..C.L.O.S., 22 LAW OF THE
SEABULL. 1, 2 (1993).
156 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, at 331.
157 G.A. Res. 38/59A, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1984).
158 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, at 336.
159 See Louis B. Sohn, Unratfied Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law, in REAuSM
iN LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF WILLEM RIPHAGEN 231, 244 n.42
(Statement of Myres McDougal) (Adriaan Bos & Hugo Siblesz eds., 1986); T.O. Elias, THE MODERN LAW
OF TREATIES 26 (1974); Martin A. Rogoff, The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an
Unratfied Treaty, 32 ME. L. REV. 263, 288 (1980).
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moral obligation. 160 The only consensus on Article 18 seems to be that it
creates an expectation among other states that the signatory state will not
violate the objects and purposes of the convention until the state shall have
ratified or rejected the convention.161 One hundred fifty-four states signed
the Convention as of March 1992,162 including Australia and Indonesia.
163
Additionally, Indonesia has ratified the Convention.
164
Article 18 thus appears to impose upon both Australia and Indonesia an
obligation not to defeat an object or purpose of the Convention. Australia
may not defeat the object or purpose of a treaty which it signs until it has
ratified or rejected the treaty because it is a party to the Vienna
Convention. 165 Being a party to the Vienna Convention obliges Australia to
respect Article 18, even if Article 18 is not part of customary international
law. Thus, Australia and Indonesia have at least a moral obligation not to
defeat the objects or purposes of the Convention.
To be encompassed by Article 18's interim obligation, Resolution Ill
must be an object or purpose of the Convention. 166 The purpose of
Resolution III, the creation of an obligation on states not to exploit the
Convention-granted rights of non-self-governing territories to the detriment
of the peoples of those territories, was an issue of major contention at the ImI
UNCLOS. 167 The Conference viewed the rights of non-self-governing
peoples as a primary consideration of the Convention, as seen in the
Preamble, which states that the Convention "takes into account the interests
and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and
needs of developing countries."'168 The Conference designed the Convention
to "promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples of the
world."'169  Resolution I followed these goals of the Convention in
advancing the rights of non-self-governing peoples, and thus its inclusion
shows a concern on the part of the Conference that it be an object or purpose
of the Convention. Because Resolution III is an object or purpose of the
Convention, Australia and Indonesia have an interim obligation under the
16 0 See Joni S. Charme, The interim Obligation ofArticle 18 of the lenna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'LL. & EcoN. 71, 104 (1991).
161 Id. at 110, 114; MeDade, supra note 6, at 47.
162 Status, supra note 6, at 5.
16 3 Id. at 1, 3.
164 Indonesia ratified the Convention on March 2, 1986. Id. at 3.
165 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, supra note 82, at 336.
166 See supra text accompanying note 158.
167 Commentary, supra note 81, at 482.
168 Convention, pmbl., supra note 5, at 1271.
169 Id.
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customary law of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention not to violate
Resolution I1. Additionally, Indonesia, by ratifying the Convention,170
accepted the provisions of Resolution m, and thus incurs a moral obligation
not to defeat Resolution ImI prior to its coming into force. 17 1
m. RESOLUTION III AND EAST TIMOR
Under subparagraph (1)(a) of Resolution III, states have a duty to
ensure that the rights and interests of the Convention are implemented for the
benefit of non-self-governing peoples.172 States also have an obligation
through Article 73 of the U.N. Charter to respect Resolution III and the rights
and interests of the Convention that it guarantees to non-self-governing
peoples. 173  Resolution III also provides that where a state asserts a
non-self-governing people's rights as its own position in a dispute over the
sovereignty of a territory to which the resolution applies and to which the
U.N. has recommended a specific means of settlement, the state's
position-and thus the non-self-governing people's rights-cannot be
prejudiced by any other state party to the dispute. 174 However, states must
respect Resolution Im only to the extent that they are bound to the
Convention. 175
Australia has an obligation under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention
both through customary and conventional international law to respect
Resolution m until and unless it rejects the Convention. 176 Indonesia not
only has an obligation to respect Resolution III under Article 18 as customary
law because of its signature to the Convention, but also because it has ratified
the Convention. 177
The Timor Gap Treaty violates Resolution III by exploiting the natural
resources of the East Timorese. Under the Convention, East Timor, as the
coastal state, has jurisdiction over a 200-mile wide exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) off of its coast. 178 Within the EEZ, the East Timorese have "sovereign
rights for the purpose of... exploiting... the natural resources.., of the
170 Status, supra note 6, at 3.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 158-161.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 144-147.
174 See supra part I.A.
175 See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
176 See supra part I1.F.
177 d.178 Convention, at. 55, 56, 57, supra note 5, at 1280.
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sea-bed and its subsoil."'179 Therefore, the Convention gives to the East
Timorese the right to control the petroleum resources located in the seabed of
their EEZ. Large petroleum reserves exist inside of East Timor's EEZ,
especially in the area of the Timor Gap.o80 Indonesia and Australia, in
devising the. Timor Gap Treaty to exploit these petroleum reserves, have
violated the rights of the East Timorese to control their natural resources. If
Indonesia or Australia wants to negotiate a JDZ for the exploitation of oil in
the Timor Gap, they must negotiate with East Timorese, or at least with
Portugal, the U.N.-recognized administering power of East Timor.
There appears to be at least a moral duty for states to respect
Resolution III where the state has ratified the Convention or signed but not
specifically rejected it.181 This moral duty disappears if Indonesia validly
controls East Timor. 182 But the General Assembly has recognized, and has
not since denied, the right of the East Timorese to self-determination.18 3
Because of this, the obligations of Resolution III concerning East Timor
remain in effect for all signatories to the Convention, including Indonesia and
Australia. Thus the Timor Gap Treaty is void because it assumes rights under
the Convention' 84 that do not exist for either Indonesia or Australia to exploit.
Those rights are reserved to the non-self-governing people of East Timor.
IV. PORTUGAL'S CASE AGAINST AUSTRALIA AND POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT
OF RESOLUTION III
Resolution I obligates Indonesia and Australia to implement the rights
and interests of the Convention that are possessed by the East Timorese for
the benefit of these non-self-governing people. By implication Resolution
III also forbids Indonesia and Australia from exploiting those rights for
themselves, although no enforcement procedure is created by Resolution I.
A state, however, could assert as its own position the rights of the East
Timorese in a dispute with Indonesia in order to utilize the provisions of
Resolution III (1)(b), which would mandate that the position of any state to
179 Id., art. 56.
180 Petroleum reserves in the Timor Gap region are estimated to contain between five hundred
million and five billion barrels of oil, which ranks the Timor Gap area as one of the twenty-five largest
oil deposits in the world. Delimitation, supra note 5, at 386.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 158-61, 170-71.
182 See supra p. 13.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27, 32, 37-44.
184 Convention rights utilized by the Timor Gap Treaty include Articles 55, 56, 57, and 77, which
define the extent of the EEZ and the coastal state's rights to exploit resources within the EEZ. Further,
the Treaty uses provisional arrangement rights under Article 83 to create the JDZ.
WINTER 1993
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
the dispute could not be prejudiced. 85 Portugal has disputed Indonesia's
sovereignty over East Timor' 86 and might be willing to assert that Indonesia
is infringing on the East Timorese people's rights to their natural wealth and
resources under the Convention.187
Portugal's case against Australia in the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) provides a forum for the adjudication of the sovereignty disputes over
East Timor, including violations of Resolution I. Portugal's case contests
Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor, bringing into effect Resolution III
(1)(b), which requires that Indonesia and Australia not prejudice Portugal's
position in the dispute supporting the rights of the people of East Timor over
their natural resources.188 Indonesia's and Australia's actions in entering and
implementing the Timor Gap Treaty evidence their violation of Resolution I.
The I.C.J. may give effect to Resolution III if it reaches the merits of
Portugal's claim.
If Portugal's case against Australia reaches the merits, it provides the
most likely vehicle for finding Australia's and Indonesia's Timor Gap Treaty
in violation of international law, including Resolution HI.189 Such a finding
by the I.C.J. would not only invalidate the Treaty, but it would put political
pressure on Australia and Indonesia to recognize the East Timorese people's
rights to self-determination and control of their natural resources.
Condemnation from the I.C.J. would at the least be an embarrassment to both
countries, 190 and might provide the impetus for the U.N. to take action
concerning East Timor. Although the U.N. does not need to wait for the
decision in Portugal's case in order to proceed against Indonesia, given the
current U.N. ambivalence toward the predicament of the East Timorese
185 Resolution III (1)(b), supra note 73.
18 6 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
187 Some of Portugal's claims have been publicized, Portugal Brings a Case Against Australia,
Communiqu6, International Court of Justice, No. 91/6, (Feb. 22, 1991); however, any claims under
Resolution I were not mentioned. Because written pleadings in the I.C.J. are not made public until at
least the beginning of oral argument, Rules of Court, Article 53(2), reprinted in Shabtai Rosenne, THE
WORLD COURT 283 (4th ed. 1989), and oral argument has not yet taken place, Portugal's use of Resolution
HI as a claim is unknown.
18 8 See supra text accompanying note 79.
189 Alternative methods of redress for East Timorese rights under Resolution III include the U.N.
asking the I.C.J. for an advisory opinion on the situation in East Timor, U.N. Charter art. 96(1); Statute of
the I.C.J. art. 65(1), and a state bringing suit in the I.C.J. asserting that Australia and Indonesia have
violated the East Timorese people's erga omnes rights of self-determination and permanent sovereignty
over natural resources, Fonteyne, supra note 135, at 174.
190 Derrick Wilde & Sasha Stepan, Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the
Zone of Co-operation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern
Australia, 18 MELANEsIANL.J. 18, 28 (1990).
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people, an I.C.J. ruling adverse to Australia and Indonesia may be the only
way to stir the U.N. to take meaningful action.
V. CONCLUSION
Resolution Ell provides the Convention's rights over the EEZ to
U.N.-recognized non-self-governing peoples, such as the East Timorese.
Australia's and Indonesia's Timor Gap Treaty violates the East Timorese
people's Convention rights by exploiting the natural resources in East Timor's
EEZ. The Timor Gap Treaty violates international law by utilizing EEZ
rights under the Convention that do not exist for either Australia or Indonesia
to use. Those rights are reserved to the non-self-governing people of East
Timor, although without U.N. intervention, it is unlikely East Timor will ever
exercise those rights.

